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Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01731R002600310002-2

21 JUL 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS,
 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
 DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ATOMIC ENERGY
 COMMISSION
 DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE
 JOINT STAFF
 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for the Voice of America
 with regard to Soviet Jamming

REFERENCE: (a) Letter from Special Assistant, Intelligence
 Department of State to the Director of Central
 Intelligence dated 24 March 1950
 (b) IAC meeting on 31 March 1950
 (c) Replies to my circular memorandum to the IAC
 members dated 14 June 1950 on the above subject

ENCLOSURE: Proposed Memorandum to Executive Secretary, National
 Security Council, with enclosure

1. Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum I propose to send to the
 Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on the above
 subject in connection with NSC 66.

2. If you have any comments thereon, kindly transmit them to
 me within a week.

DOS, USAF reviews completed

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R. H. HILLERKOPFER
 Rear Admiral, USN
 Director of Central
 Intelligence

PC:ctd
 COAPS-21 July 1950

Distributions:

cc: Exec. Secy. NSC
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PROPOSED MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for the Voice of America with
Regard to Soviet Jamming

REFERENCE: (a) Letter from Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State to the Director of Central
Intelligence, dated 24 March 1950
(b) IAC Meeting on 31 March 1950

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on VOA Jamming for distribution to members of the Security Council. With respect to the above references, this Committee was authorized for the express purpose of considering intelligence support for the Voice of America with regard to the penetration of Soviet jamming.

2. The report and its recommendations have the unanimous concurrence of the Committee members and bears a direct relationship to NSC 66 now pending before the National Security Council.

3. Expressions of unqualified approval have been received from all members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee except the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force. A copy of his letter is attached.

4. In line with the unanimous opinion of the intelligence organizations of the State and Defense Departments on the need for increased monitoring activities, it is recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence be directed to expand the present CIA monitoring service as a "service of common concern" under Section 102(d)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to coordinate this to avoid duplicating the existing facilities of FCC, AFSA and other organizations into a world-wide monitoring operation.

5. It is further recommended that this expanded operation be concerned with a positive identification and location of sources of radio signals emanating from within the Soviet Union and Satellite States and with the characteristics of these signals throughout the frequency bands normally used for communication..

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6. The initial cost might be as much as [redacted] and annual maintenance thereafter about [redacted]. CIA does not now have funds for this purpose.

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7. Special attention is invited to the urgent need for such a facility in the light of the intensification of the telecommunications war (Recommendation 3 of the Report).

Enclosure:
Copy USAF letter

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[Signature]

C O P Y **SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01731R002600310002-2
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D.C.

27 June 1950
(Enclosure)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for the Voice of America with
Regard to Soviet Jamming.

1. In reply to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 14 June 1950, I approve the IAC ad hoc committee report subject to the following amendments:

a. Insertion of new paragraph 3, Recommendations, to read as follows:

"3. That the VOA attempt to penetrate Soviet jamming by increasing the radiating power and the number of stations".

b. Rerumber present paragraph 3 of Recommendations and amend to read as follows:

"3" 4. That upon failure of the VOA to penetrate Soviet jamming by the methods indicated in paragraph 3, above, or by some other technique, the IAC recommend consideration by NSC of the establishment of an additional monitoring facility, provided that consideration is undertaken in the light of the limited amount of technical intelligence for VOA which could be obtained (see Conclusion 4 and 5 above) and the probable utility of such a facility in any future intensification of the telecommunication war. and further provided that:

a. Such new facilities do not interfere with existing monitoring programs, particularly from the standpoint of equipment and personnel.

b. Such new facilities are thoroughly coordinated with existing monitoring activities.

Such facilities should be organized and equipped to locate the sources and determine the characteristics of radio signals emanating from within

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the Soviet Union and satellite states throughout the frequency-bands normally used for communications.

c. That paragraph 4 Recommendations be renumbered as paragraph 5.

/s/ C. P. Cabell

C. P. CABELL
Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence

Copies furnished to:

1. Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
2. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
3. Director of Naval Intelligence
4. Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
5. Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
6. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

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intelligence agencies as to the degree of priority necessary to undertake this effort successfully and the particular type of closely-knit effort required. It has become apparent that the VOA problem cannot be considered apart from other problems of communications research, counter-measures and development which face the Government as a whole, and that each of these problems places heavy demands upon scarce intelligence facilities. The question of intelligence support for the VOA effort to penetrate Soviet jamming must be considered in relation to the intelligence support required in the fields of counter-jamming and anti-jamming. There is also the possibility that the VOA may represent a security hazard to our communications in the event of war by exposing prematurely the development of U. S. techniques and capacities to penetrate jamming.

Inasmuch as the emphasis to be placed upon the VOA problem in relation to other problems in the communications field has not been determined, the Department of State is preparing to submit the broad question of relative priorities among communications problems to the National Security Council and to request that the NSC (1) establish the degree to which the technical communications effort to penetrate Soviet jamming should be undertaken and (2) indicate the relative priority in the field of intelligence necessary to support this effort. Pending the determination of NSC policy in these matters, the Assistant Secretary of State, Public Affairs, has requested that the intelligence agencies establish an appropriate interim effort to meet the immediate needs of the VOA. This interim effort would also serve as a means to explore the capacity of existing intelligence facilities to undertake a broader program should the NSC so decide. At present there appear to exist among the intelligence and monitoring agencies adequate facilities to undertake the interim effort which has been requested.

CONCLUSIONS

The present intelligence effort in support of the VOA is insufficient to meet the requirements of the Department of State.

The full extent to which intelligence facilities should be committed to support VOA cannot be determined until the NSC has established the relative priority of the VOA problem in relation to other problems in the field of communications research, counter-measures and development.

Pending determination of such a policy, the IAC agencies should undertake an interim intelligence effort as requested by the Department of State. This effort should be organized within the framework of existing facilities. It should not be out of proportion to other priority

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
intelligence tasks, nor should it be permitted to jeopardize the security of intelligence sources. It should also serve to explore the particular type of effort and the extent of facilities which would be required, should a broader program be required in the future.

The facilities to commence this effort are available among the existing intelligence and monitoring agencies.

The CIA should continue its responsibility to establish a co-ordinated program in this field and to collect and evaluate relevant technical data. This program should also provide that data may be passed directly and promptly to the Department of State for evaluation and use on a daily basis by IBD and the VOA. The establishment of such an interim program would require the active support of the IAC agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the DCI, with the full support of the IAC agencies, immediately initiate a project to assemble, collate, and evaluate currently available technical data required for the VOA operation.
2. That, in addition to (1) above, an ad hoc committee of the IAC be established to consider and recommend to the IAC, within one month, an interim and exploratory program for technical intelligence support of the VOA, to be carried out pending an NSC decision as to the relative priority of the VOA problem. This program should provide for:



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3. That any request for AFSA support under (2 b) above be considered by IAC and referred to USCIB for action.

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TAB A

THE PROBLEM

To determine the intelligence effort which should be undertaken to assure that the Department of State is provided all possible and reasonable support in the development of technical intelligence whereby to penetrate Soviet jamming of the Voice of America.

DISCUSSION

The VOA is undertaking an extensive program to penetrate Soviet jamming of its Russian language broadcasts beamed to the USSR. To this end the Department of State requires (1) all possible intelligence on Soviet jamming operations and techniques and (2) the best available technical research and recommendations on further measures that may be taken to penetrate Soviet jamming. Although the Department has received some useful data from intelligence sources, this data has not been sufficient to meet the present need, nor does it appear to represent the complete body of data which has been available among the intelligence agencies.

An adequate intelligence effort in support of the VOA would require:

- (1) A program to allocate this effort among all available monitoring facilities and to assure close, daily coordination in the use of these facilities.
- (2) A coordinated program among the intelligence agencies to collect and associate relevant data from non-monitoring sources.
- (3) Agreement among the intelligence agencies that this program should be undertaken as a matter of high priority.
- (4) The establishment of direct, secure channels to pass data to the Department of State.
- (5) Provision whereby this data may be used and evaluated on a daily basis by the International Broadcasting Division (IBD) and the VOA.

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Present arrangements to provide intelligence support for the VOA have developed as follows:

- (1) NSC-4 provides that the departments and agencies concerned should insure the most effective coordination and utilization of their appropriate facilities for the implementation of approved foreign information policies. There was established an Interdepartmental Consultative Group for Coordination of Foreign Information Measures under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State, Public Affairs, and the Department of State was designated as implementing authority in this field. The Central Intelligence Agency was charged with responsibility to coordinate the collection and evaluation of relevant intelligence. These recommendations of NSC-4 were approved by the President in December 1947.
- (2) Soviet jamming of the VOA commenced in February 1948. From that time until July 1949, IBD attempted to obtain information on Soviet jamming through its connections with the various government operating agencies in the field of communications and through its participation in the Interdepartmental Consultative Group.
- (3) At a meeting of the Interdepartmental Consultative Group on July 6, 1949 the question of providing coordinated intelligence support for the VOA was discussed in detail. The following steps were taken as a result of this meeting:
 - (a) The CIA assumed responsibility to provide co-ordinated intelligence support, and the Department of State indicated to the DCI the specific types of technical data which it required.
 - (b) The CIA undertook to collect and evaluate this data.
 - (c) The Department of State forwarded letters to the Department of Defense and the Federal Communications Commission requesting their support for the co-ordinated effort to be undertaken by the CIA.

Recent developments in Soviet jamming have increased the urgent need for timely data on new Soviet equipment and techniques. It is now clear that the steps taken since July 1949 to provide intelligence support in this field have not been sufficient to meet these developments. This appears to have been due primarily to lack of agreement among the

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LETTER FROM SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE TO DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MARCH 24, 1950

Appendix 1 to the Report of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee on VOA Jamming

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C O P Y

ER 0-9685

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Washington

March 24, 1950

Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter:

The Voice of America, which constitutes almost the only overt means of providing information of the free world to the peoples of the USSR and its satellites, is a primary instrument in implementing the foreign policy of the United States. Soviet jamming, however, has seriously reduced the effectiveness of VOA broadcasts. Vigorous efforts are being made to penetrate this jamming, and in this connection Congress has appropriated over [redacted] for the increase of radio facilities.

To make these efforts effective, the Department of State has a critical need for all possible intelligence on Soviet jamming operations and techniques. The Assistant Secretary of State, Public Affairs, has requested that intelligence agencies undertake a specific program to meet this need.

There is attached as Tab A a study of this problem including recommendations for action to be taken by the Director of Central Intelligence and the IAC agencies. Attached as Tab B is an itemized listing of the types of technical intelligence data required by the VOA. In view of the urgency of this problem, it is requested that a special meeting of the IAC be called as soon as possible to consider the recommendations in Tab A.

Copies of this letter are being sent to the other members of the IAC.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

W. Park Armstrong Jr.

Enclosures:

Tabs A and B

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter,
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.

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6. Any increase beyond the present intelligence effort on behalf of the VOA can be accomplished only by:

a. A substantial readjustment of priorities with existing facilities, which would be at the expense of the intelligence activities directed at determining Soviet capabilities and intentions in the fields of Atomic Energy, Air Defense, Submarine Warfare, Order of Battle, etc; or

b. The establishment of additional monitoring facilities directed specifically at the VOA problem.

Recommendations.

1. All available information pertinent to the VOA problem should be furnished promptly to State by all IAC agencies and that OSI/CIA be designated as the collection point for such information. OSI/CIA with the assistance of the Office of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, should be charged to determine and establish such security arrangements and channels of dissemination as may be required to pass this information to the International Broadcasting Division, Department of State; these arrangements and channels to be determined in the light of materials made available.

2. A readjustment of priorities among existing intelligence tasks or a reallocation of the use of existing intelligence facilities should not be undertaken.

3. That the IAC recommend consideration by NSC of the establishment of an additional monitoring facility, provided that such consideration is undertaken in the light of the limited amount of technical intelligence for VOA which could be obtained (see Conclusions 4 and 5 above) and the

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probable utility of such a facility in any future intensification of the telecommunications war; and further provided that:

- a. Such new facilities do not interfere with existing monitoring programs, particularly from the standpoint of equipment and personnel.
- b. Such new facilities are thoroughly coordinated with existing monitoring activities.

Such facilities should be organized and equipped to locate the sources and determine the characteristics of radio signals emanating from within the Soviet Union and satellite states throughout the frequency bands normally used for communications.

4. That the Ad Hoc Committee be dissolved upon acceptance of this report.

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Communications Commission and Armed Forces Security Agency and other organizations into a worldwide monitoring operation. This is not agreed to by the intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. They recommend that this matter be given further consideration by the United States Communications Intelligence Board and by the Armed Forces Security Agency Council.

5. Accordingly, Recommendation 3 in this Report will be referred to the USCIB.

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R. H. MILLERKOTTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central
Intelligence

cc: IAC Members (less enclosure)

AFSA

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
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REPORT OF THE IAC AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON SOVIET JAMMING OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA

2 June 1950

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REPORT OF THE IAC AD HOC COMMITTEE ON SOVIET
JAMMING OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA

Statement of Problem. The problem, and the stated purpose of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee on VOA Jamming, is to determine the intelligence effort which should be undertaken to assure that the Department of State is provided all possible and reasonable support in the development of technical intelligence wherewith to penetrate Soviet jamming of the Voice of America. To determine this intelligence effort, the operational and the research and development aspects of the problem must both be considered.

Background of Problem. Organized jamming of the VOA by the Soviets commenced in February 1948 and steadily increased in intensity until it reached substantially the present level in April 1949. As the result of a meeting of the Interdepartmental Consultative Group on 6 July 1949, the CIA was asked and agreed to accept responsibility for providing the co-ordinated intelligence support needed by State in order to determine future measures in connection with Soviet jamming. In addition, the support of the Department of Defense and the FCC was solicited by the State Department and was agreed to. A CIA report OSI-1-50 published 20 January 1950 and entitled "Historical Developments in the Jamming of the VOA by the USSR" sets forth all the intelligence on the subject known to CIA at that time.

On 31 March 1950, the IAC met, at the request of the Special Assistant, Intelligence Department of State, to consider his memorandum, dated 24 March on the subject of Soviet jamming of VOA. At this meeting, the IAC

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established an Ad Hoc Committee to examine the problem of intelligence support for the VOA on the basis of recommendations set forth in that memorandum.

Deliberations of Ad Hoc Committee. Although the problem referred to the Ad Hoc Committee by the IAC was stated primarily in terms of intelligence requirements and capacities, it was realized that review of technical and other aspects of the problem was prerequisite to consideration of the intelligence aspects. Consequently, representatives selected by the Departments for membership on the Ad Hoc Committee included those qualified in the fields of intelligence, communications, and electronic countermeasures. The CIA membership included all the activities concerned with intelligence collection and production in this field.

Three meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee were held during which the Committee considered the following aspects of the problem.

1. Technical feasibility of devising methods to overcome Soviet jamming.
2. Operational usefulness to VOA of technical intelligence.
3. The need to pass available pertinent information promptly to VOA on a continuing basis. This included a discussion of special conditions to be attached to the use of such information, particularly with regard to:
 - a. security of sources, and
 - b. channels of dissemination.
4. Detailed consideration of each item of information needed as set forth in Tab B, Appendix I hereto, with regard to how such intelligence might be obtained through the use of monitoring facilities, covert operations or other means now available among the intelligence agencies.

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5. Allocation and use of existing monitoring facilities.
6. Exploitation of existing non-monitoring sources.
7. Extent and usefulness of additional monitoring effort.

A detailed account of these deliberations is contained in the minutes of the meetings of this Ad Hoc Committee.

Conclusions.

1. Existing scientific knowledge and techniques do not offer a solution which will enable the VOA to overcome the Soviet jamming.
2. The effectiveness of the efforts of the VOA to penetrate this jamming can be increased by knowledgeable manipulation of the transmitting facilities, increased number of stations, increased radiated power, etc. If the Soviets counter all such efforts, as now appears to be their intention, the effectiveness of penetration, though increased, would be temporary and limited in scope.
3. Technical intelligence on Soviet jamming would assist in policy considerations to determine the effort and facilities which should be allocated to the VOA and would be essential to effective operational manipulation. Currently available intelligence is not sufficient for these purposes.
4. The total information requirements as set forth by the VOA in Tab B of Appendix 1 are beyond the combined capabilities of all existing intelligence facilities of the FCC, CIA, and the Department of Defense. A small percentage of the VOA requirements could be met by these combined facilities, but only if they dropped most of their present priority commitments.
5. Answers to most of the intelligence requirements of the VOA as listed in Tab B of Appendix 1 hereto can be obtained only by covert means.

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DECISION OF USCIB AT ITS 55TH MEETING

PART I:

That there would be established, an Ad Hoc Committee to consider with the VOA representatives the problem of providing assistance to VOA program to include the determination of estimates of personnel, facilities, and funds required to carry out the program envisaged by the VOA. The Ad Hoc Committee will consist of the following:

Captain J. R. Dennis, USN, AFSA - Chairman
Robert Packard, State Department
Technical Representative of VOA - State Department
Albert Small, Army
Captain L. S. Howeth, USN, Navy
Lt. Colonel J. L. Weeks, Air
[redacted] CIA.

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PART II:

That the military services would proceed on an interim basis with an effort to determine what assistance to the VOA could be rendered with existing facilities and personnel.

26 September 1950

2cc Chief, A/C

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